By 
Dr Aisha Tosan Agberebi
By Dr Aisha Tosan Agberebi, COO, Crime Fighters-The Police & You
Should the federal government allow states to police themselves? It is one of the oldest arguments in Nigeria’s constitutional history, and one of the most urgent. At its simplest, state policing is territorial policing: a model common in federal systems, in which state governments raise, fund, and direct their own officers, separate from a federal force.
Governors, security experts, and ordinary citizens have made this case for decades while watching kidnappers, bandits, and insurgents operate with impunity. Nigeria’s deteriorating security situation lends real weight to the argument. The scale of insecurity makes a compelling case on its own. The Nigeria Police Force, founded in 1930, now serves roughly 350 million people with only about 325,000 personnel, well short of the United Nations’ recommended ratio of one officer per 400 citizens — a shortfall that critics say is worsened by entrenched nepotism and an overly centralized command structure. State governments are estimated to cover around 70 percent of the force’s costs yet have no say over how officers are deployed.
The Lagos State Security Trust Fund channelled 4.765 billion naira into police vehicles and equipment in April 2016 alone, while a former Plateau State police commissioner says his command went eighteen months without a single federal vehicle or litre of fuel, relying entirely on the state. Federal budgets tell the same story: in 2015, the police received 5 billion naira against a request of 71 billion naira for recurrent costs. A former Inspector-General of Police told the House of Representatives plainly that an underfunded, poorly equipped police force only emboldens criminals — a verdict that has done little to loosen the federal government’s grip on policing.
The Constitution itself is out of step with federalism. It places the Nigeria Police Force under the President and Inspector-General alone, giving governors no command authority over security in their own states, even though a federal force enforces state laws and feeds state courts. Former Lagos Governor Babatunde Fashola argued that if states can run their own courts and assemblies, enforcing those laws through a state police force is no great leap. Nigeria’s scale and diversity — roughly 250 million people, over 250 ethnic groups, 500 languages — make single-centre policing exceptionally difficult. States have already moved to fill the gap with quasi-police outfits such as Amotekun in the south-west, Ebube-Agu in the south-east, Doo-akpo in Bayelsa, the Delta State Security Corps, the Edo State Security Network, and similar bodies in Kano, Benue, Kwara, Niger, Nasarawa and Lagos.
Formal state police would simply give legitimacy to security structures that states have already built. Governors also lack real command. The Constitution provides no clear answer as to whose orders prevail when the President, the Inspector-General, and a governor conflict. Former Plateau Governor Jonah Jang called himself “the chief security officer of a state without a troop” after watching communal massacres he could not direct police to stop, and a Rivers State police commissioner once defied Governor Rotimi Amaechi’s direct order outright.
Critics fear that state governors would weaponise state police against rivals, is neither here nor there; the existing centralised force has repeatedly been turned to federal political ends — from Shehu Shagari’s 1979 clash with Bendel State over police control, to the alleged use of police to intimidate the opposition that same year, to the 2003 abduction of Anambra Governor Chris Ngige. If a centrally controlled force can already be abused this way, the objection to state police applies just as much to the status quo and is no reason to deny states one. This is not a call for an unregulated free-for-all.
State police should come paired with oversight committees empowered to check governors’ security decisions and shield officers from political interference, backed by a clearer separation of powers and a well-funded judiciary. The proposed split is simple: state forces would handle local and municipal crime, freeing the federal force to focus on terrorism, kidnapping, and cross-border offences already prosecuted under state law in local courts.
Nigeria’s regional policing system under the 1963 Republican Constitution was phased out as military rule centralized authority from the mid-1960s. This shift was based on the belief— shaped by challenges faced during the First Republic—that regions couldn’t maintain disciplined forces independently. Multiple reform committees, such as the Tamuno Committee under President Obasanjo, the 2006 National Security Adviser review, the 2008 Danmadami Committee, and the 2012 Parry Osayande Committee, have repeatedly addressed similar structural challenges. However, critics argue that these initiatives have largely remained mere rhetoric without significant tangible change.
Federalism is meant to keep government close to the people, and each state faces distinct security challenges that local officers — familiar with the terrain, language, and culture — are better placed to manage. A government unable to guarantee basic safety has failed at its most fundamental task; without security, people cannot engage in productive economic activity, nor can the state direct its resources toward genuine development. The failure is already clear in the rise of abductions, terrorism, and banditry. There is a rise in vigilante groups, community self-defence networks, and private security measures nationwide. While it remains uncertain whether state police can fully resolve Nigeria’s security issues, it’s a valid concern. Considering the country’s widespread insecurity, uneven federal funding, and a constitutional setup in which many governors claim responsibility for security without actual authority, the idea of allowing states to police themselves is one Nigeria can no longer ignore.
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